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GOVERNMENT AS ADMINISTRATOR VS.
GOVERNMENT AS PURCHASER: DO RULES
OR MARKETS CREATE GREATER
ACCOUNTABILITY IN SERVING THE POOR?
David R. Riemer*
INTRODUCTION:
THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF ACCOUNTABILITY
We are immersed in a sea of accountability.
The bed we crawl out of each morning (unless it was manufactured
decades ago) meets the safety standards set by the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission. We brush our teeth with water that
meets U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") standards;
and as the wastewater flows down to the treatment plant, it must
meet conveyance and treatment requirements of both the EPA and
the state's department of natural resources. Want eggs and a piece
of toasted rye bread for breakfast? The U.S. Department of Agri-
culture regulates the practices of the farmer whose chickens laid
the eggs and monitors the pesticides used on the wheat that the
miller turned into the flour that the baker transformed into bread.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, meanwhile, oversees the
safety of the final food products. Teeth brushed and well fed, we
find our way to the garage, climb into the family car, and head for
work. City police officers-public employees trained to follow the
protocols of their chief and comply with the rules of the police
commission-keep an eye on us to make sure we do not exceed the
speed limits or fail to signal when changing lanes. If we are typical
of the American workforce, we likely will ride on a local street paid
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for by a municipal government but built by private contractors ac-
cording to the terms of lengthy purchasing processes.'
It is not even 9:00 a.m., and already we have swum through a sea
of accountability: federal, state, and local accountability; regulatory
accountability, administrative accountability, and procurement ac-
countability. As the day proceeds, many of our daily activities
bring into play one type of accountability or another. Switch on
the computer? A state public utility commission regulates the
price of the electricity we consume. Cross the street for a bite of
lunch? The city traffic light, maintained by the municipal depart-
ment of public works, ensures that the cars on Main Street do not
run us over as we walk from curb to curb. Get stuck behind a
school bus on the way home? The public school district has the bus
company under contract to take kids home from afterschool bas-
ketball practice. Different levels and types of governmental ac-
countability dog us every step of the way.
The thought of which model of accountability works best has
never entered our minds. Most of us simply assume that, which-
ever level of government exercises whatever type of accountability,
it is the appropriate level of government and the proper type of
accountability. In the academic world, however, and even more in
the day-to-day world of public administration, the question of what
type of accountability works best for different forms of governmen-
tal activity is a hot topic. 2
Much of the debate centers around so-called privatization. If
government takes a classic government function (like sanitation,
library operation, administration of welfare benefits, and most con-
troversial of all, public education) and shifts responsibility for "de-
livering" the function from public employees to private firms under
contract, is it possible to preserve accountability?
1. A typical government procurement involves the government's incorporation
of pages of written specifications (increasingly, these days, simply listed on the gov-
ernment purchasing agency's Web site) into a request for bids, submission of compet-
ing bids by vendors, selection of the lowest "qualifying" bid by government
bureaucrats, signing of a boilerplate contract by the vendor, and then ongoing per-
formance monitoring by a different group of government bureaucrats until yet a third
set of government bureaucrats authorizes release of the final payment upon comple-
tion of performance.
2. E.g., DAVID OSBORNE & PETER PLASTRIK, BANISHING BUREAUCRACY: THE
FIVE STRATEGIES FOR REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1997); JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE
PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS (1989).
1716
2001] ACCOUNTABILITY IN SERVING THE POOR 1717
PRIVATIZATION: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE
The debate over privatization masks the fact that, whether gov-
ernment provides services with its own employees or buys the same
services from private vendors, government remains in charge. In
the case of delivery of services to the poor, be they service job
placement or health care or education, the decisions about whether
a particular service will be delivered in the first place, when the
service will start (and end), to whom the service will be delivered,
how much of the service will be delivered, and what type of service
will be delivered are all made by government officials, whether the
service is delivered by government employees or private
companies.
The threshold decision is whether government should provide a
service at all. For example, should government offer low-income
adults the opportunity to work in community service jobs if they
fail to obtain private-sector employment? Government clearly de-
cides this question. There is no privatization issue at all.
Once government has decided whether to provide a service, the
next question is when, i.e., under what circumstances, government
should provide the service. For instance, should subsidized health
insurance for poor, uninsured, working parents be offered as soon
as they lose employer-sponsored coverage, or should coverage be
delayed for a fixed waiting period (e.g., three months after the em-
ployer's coverage ceases) in order to discourage employers from
canceling their health insurance? This is a classic policy question.
On the one hand, government wants to meet the unmet public
need. On the other hand, in situations in which private firms may
voluntarily assume responsibility for employees' welfare, govern-
ment does not want to give the private sector an incentive to shift
costs to taxpayers. But notice who is making the "when" decision:
government, through law or regulation, decides upon the point in
time when it will start to insure the uninsured. There is no priva-
tization issue.
Indeed, in carrying out public policy, government makes virtu-
ally all of the important decisions, without privatization even com-
ing into play. After deciding whether and when government
should provide a typical service, e.g., the provision of health care to
the poor, government also decides what categories of poor will be
entitled to coverage (the "who" question), what levels of health
care will be provided (the "how much" question-in this example,
determining whether the plan will cover not just hospitalization
and medical care, but dental care or vision care as well), and what
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degree of health care services will be provided (the "what type of
service" question-in this context, resolving the matter of whether
dental care, for instance, means only treatment of dental problems
or also includes preventive check-ups and cleaning or orthodontia).
However government answers these questions, only government is
authorized and equipped to make the final decisions. The issue of
privatization simply does not crop up.
So what is privatization about? After all the key decisions listed
above have been made by government itself-whether to provide a
service, when to provide it, whom to provide it to, how much to
provide, and what type of service to provide-one narrow question
remains: What kind of organization should provide (or, in the argot
of public administration, "deliver") the service? That is, should
government utilize its own employees to deliver the service, or
purchase it from private firms?
THE REAL ISSUE: CHOOSING BETWEEN Two TYPES
OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The decision whether to use a traditional administrative struc-
ture to deliver a service or instead purchase it from a private ven-
dor-a choice that Professor John D. Donahue calls "the
privatization decision" 3'-in fact raises two distinct issues. What
type of organization should deliver the service? What kind of ac-
countability structure is most effective in producing a successful
program? That the privatization decision raises the question of
who will deliver a service-government employees or private
firms-is undisputed. But the proposition that a privatization deci-
sion also raises the issue of what kind of accountability framework
is most effective is not self-evident.
It can be argued that privatization inherently destroys accounta-
bility by removing traditional administrative oversight of a public
function. Once government strips away from its own organization
and employees the power to operate a program and confers that
power on private organizations and their employees, the argument
goes, government loses the capacity to hold the program accounta-
ble for either process or outcome. Where government organiza-
tions generally can be trusted to weed out criminals, cheats, and
others who cannot be trusted to conduct public business, private
3. See Remarks of John D. Donahue, in Panel Discussion, Living with Privatiza-
tion: At Work and in the Community, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector:
Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1397 (2001). See generally DONAHUE, supra note 2.
1718
2001] ACCOUNTABILITY IN SERVING THE POOR 1719
organizations are free to hire anybody regardless of qualification.
Where government employees generally can be relied upon to re-
frain from discrimination based on race or ethnicity, private em-
ployees can easily get away with violating civil rights. Where
government employees generally will not steal public funds, private
employees will be so tempted to steal that theft is unavoidable.
Where government employees generally can be counted on to get
the job done because of their strong work ethic, as well as their
knowledge that their careers as civil servants depend on solid per-
formance, private employees will inevitably fail to deliver the
goods because they are not invested in the success of the program
and because their career tracks do not depend upon performance.
In short, this viewpoint assumes that if government privatizes, the
possibility of true accountability is eliminated. If we accept this
claim, it is then ridiculous even to talk about the efficacy of the
accountability structure that pertains to privatized services. There
is no accountability structure at all.
The underpinning of the opposite claim, which I have heard
often from the champions of school vouchers, is that reliance on a
traditional administrative structure to deliver services creates a
monopoly in which government's performance can never be com-
pared to competitors within a market. Because there is no rational
basis for comparing government's performance as administrator to
competing alternatives, there can be no true accountability. When
government creates huge bureaucracies and hires thousands of em-
ployees in even the most well-meaning effort to get a job done, the
argument runs, how in the absence of visible competition can we
measure whether the government has achieved its goals
effectively?
A severe critique of the civil service system often reinforces this
argument. The civil service system, it is asserted, lacks the tools to
fire the corrupt and inept, motivate and retrain the mediocre, or
reward the stars. As a result, the level of competence in any gov-
ernmental structure is dismal. Government employees, protected
from dismissal for all but heinous crimes, yet unable to translate
their success into reward, hunker down for the duration, do the
least necessary to avoid trouble, and soon start calculating their
pensions to the penny. Only by liberating government programs
from such lethargic bureaucracies and vesting responsibility in pri-
vate organizations that are subject to performance-based con-
straints and incentives do we stand any chance of getting
government's business done well and at a reasonable cost. In other
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL[Vol. XXVIII
words, only if government privatizes its programs can it achieve
accountability.
Both arguments have rhetorical power. Neither side wants to
concede an inch to the other. It is tempting to throw up one's
hands and give up. But because government programs are so vital,
we have no choice but to think this matter through and try to
achieve clarity of understanding, if not universal consensus.
COMMON (IF HIDDEN) GROUND
The starting point to answering the accountability question
should be the acknowledgment that, however intensely the com-
batants from the opposing sides hold their competing views, they
and everyone in between deeply believe in accountability. This
may seem obvious, but the fact is that some combatants on both
sides think their adversaries "just don't care" about accountability.
Some advocates of the "government as administrator" model be-
lieve that their pro-privatization opponents "just don't care" about
corruption, theft, and non-performance. Similarly, some champi-
ons of privatization believe that those who want government to ad-
minister all programs "just don't care" about governmental
incompetence or lack of performance in the absence of competitive
pressure. In fact, whether or not they acknowledge the power of
their opponents' arguments, everybody engaged in this debate
cares intensely about accountability. The dispute is truly not a dis-
pute about the end-accountability-but about the means.
And in the final analysis, all embrace not just the same end but
the same means. Every combatant in the privatization debate be-
lieves in a "mixed" system for achieving accountability in which
governmental rules create the overarching framework and govern-
ment employees enforce the framework, but individuals applying
their private values and preferences exercise huge amounts of dis-
cretion. How can this be? How can those who champion govern-
ment as administrator favor (whether they acknowledge it or not)
private decision-making? How can the supporters of privatization
embrace (whether they know it or not) the need for government
control?
Obviously, the advocates of government as administrator believe
in a system where government (both elected officials and the bu-
reaucrats who carry out their statutes, ordinances, and resolutions)
sets the framework, and government officials enforce the frame-
work. But as any county district attorney will tell you, there is a lot
of discretion in deciding how to enforce the law. In other words,
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there is a mighty lot of private decision-making-which is really
what privatization is all about-in deciding which suspects to pros-
ecute, which plea bargains to accept, and which sentences to
demand.
The recent debate over President George W. Bush's nomination
of former U.S. Senator John Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General
centers on this very point. Both Ashcroft's foes and allies agreed
that, were he to become the Attorney General, the constitutional
and statutory framework within which he would function would al-
low him enormous room to insert into the decision-making process
his personal beliefs about abortion, the death penalty, and other
hot-button issues. Ashcroft's enemies opposed him precisely be-
cause, as Attorney General, he will have huge discretion to make
what are essentially private decisions about the nation's laws. His
allies want him there for exactly the same reason: he will allow his
personal views, which they happen to like, to influence his official
decisions.
But if the opponents of privatization ultimately believe in a
mixed system under which, within the framework of government-
set rules, officials enjoy enormous room for private decision-mak-
ing, the advocates of privatization also believe in a mixed system
that has the same core structure: a government framework, and
within it ample room for private decision-making. Indeed, advo-
cates of privatization believe in what might be considered a dual
mixed system-one that has two governmental frameworks, within
which two types of private decision-making occur.
THE DUAL FRAMEWORK OF PRIVATIZATION
Privatization advocates believe in the market. But the market is
no private organism. Government created it; government oversees
it. Government grants charters (in the form of corporate status) to
virtually all the private actors in the market-the nonprofit and
for-profit private organizations that conduct the market's business.
Government may revoke the charter of any private corporation, at
any time, if it violates the terms of its charter. Without this initial
state grant of power and privilege to corporations, including the
privilege of limited liability for profit-making corporations' share-
holders, the private sector as we know it would not exist.
The two main marketplace powers that private firms exercise are
the powers, in the firm's own right and in its own name (i.e., inde-
pendent of the individuals who happen to serve on the firm's board
of directors, or function as president or CEO), to (1) acquire, own,
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sell, and lease property and (2) enter into binding contracts. But
without government-without a vast web of statutory laws enacted
by legislatures and common law created by judges, registration of-
fices staffed by government employees, and courts, clerks, bailiffs,
and police who enforce the law-property and contract rights
would be meaningless. With all due respect to Locke, Jefferson,
and the theorists who gave us the inalienable right to property, it is
hard to imagine how, absent government's role, one could create a
functioning system of property and contracts, at least one powerful
enough to bridge a continent and span the globe. Perhaps such a
construct can be achieved in the abstract. But in the real world-
certainly in the United States of America-government creates the
framework within which private firms make their deals and their
money. Government makes the market.
As modern markets have evolved, government's role in shaping
the markets has grown, too. The governmental framework within
which private firms compete does not stop at governmentally-cre-
ated, governmentally-enforced property rights and contracts. Gov-
ernment agencies protect the rights of workers in private firms.
Private employees do not have civil service status to give them an
extra measure of protection; but they have governmental agencies
such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to protect them from different types of
harm. These governmental oversight agencies impose a large mea-
sure of public discipline on the private labor market.
Government agencies similarly impose requirements on private
firms that protect their shareholders (if they have any), their lend-
ers, and their consumers. In sum, a vast web of governmental re-
quirements relating to incorporation, property, contract,
employees, investors, lenders, and consumers creates a sophisti-
cated public framework within which all private firms must make
their decisions.
FUNCTION-SPECIFIC MIXED SYSTEMS
The mixed system described so far-an elaborate blend of gov-
ernmental structure and private activity-applies to all privatiza-
tion. A second mixed system of governmental structure and
private activity applies to the specific privatization contract that a
given firm enters into in order to carry out a specific human service
program. When government privatizes, it does not privatize in
general; it privatizes a particular function for a particular length of
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time. In the State of A, within the Department of B, Agency C
enters into a specific contract for a defined term of years with ei-
ther vendor X, Y, or Z (whichever submitted the best proposal) to
perform delineated functions. Although the contract is governed
by the general rules of the law of contracts, the specific rules of this
contract create a second, case-specific mixed system-an individu-
alized government framework within which the private firm must
do what the government is paying the firm to do.
The request for proposals ("RFP") and the contract itself are the
main pillars of this second framework. Typically incorporated by
reference into the government's contract with the vendor, the RFP
sets forth the government's expectations, requirements, and condi-
tions. The contract functions to augment those expectations, re-
quirements, and conditions, as well as to spell out exactly what
government will pay, set forth a payment schedule, and bind the
vendor to the government's preferences for resolving disputes
about performance.
In the final analysis, the debate between opponents and propo-
nents of privatization is neither a dispute about the need for ac-
countability, nor a dispute about whether accountability will be
achieved through a mixed system under which government im-
poses a framework but individuals- exercise extensive discretion in
making decisions. It is a dispute about which mixed system of ac-
countability is best. Does the traditional administrative model-a
system of government rules within which the state's own employ-
ees exercise wide discretion-produce the best results? Or does
the market model-which is merely a different system of govern-
ment rules within which individuals exercise their discretion-pro-
duce the best results?
The answer is (and not because this article appears in a law jour-
nal): it depends.
WHEN TO TURN TO ACCOUNTABILITY VIA THE MARKET
In the workaday world of public administration, we heavily use
both mixed systems of accountability. Each has been proven to
yield good results. In the City of Milwaukee, for instance, city em-
ployees assess residential and commercial property values, and
their decisions are widely accepted and often highly praised (even
though most of us do not enjoy paying the higher taxes that, we
imagine, result from higher assessments). In the area of human
resources, Milwaukee County employees sign up the poor for Food
Stamps and Medicaid; by all accounts, they are dedicated public
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servants and do a decent job. But we hire private vendors to do
most of our major street reconstruction, and their work is also
highly regarded and complimented. In the Medicaid context, al-
though government employees sign up the poor for this program,
what the poor enroll in is a private, for-profit health maintenance
organization ("HMO"). Each HMO in turn delivers health care
through private doctors and private hospitals. Hardly anyone
wants to require Medicaid participants to obtain their health care
at government-owned and -operated hospitals and clinics, staffed
100% by government employees, however much HMOs are
criticized.
In many areas, we take both approaches. City of Milwaukee em-
ployees develop some of the information systems we put in place,
and we hire outside contractors to do the rest. In the human ser-
vices area, the State of Wisconsin delivers primary and secondary
education through both public school systems and voucher-funded
private schools. Has providing services directly via government
proven more cost-effective or less cost-effective than using outside
vendors? As I noted before, it depends.
I have difficulty developing a formal theory that consistently ex-
plains the circumstances in which direct administration with its
mixed system of accountability works better, or worse, than priva-
tization with its mixed system of accountability. But over thirteen
years of helping to establish or finance a range of programs that
serve the poor and the communities they live in-ranging from the
core municipal services of the City of Milwaukee (i.e., police, fire,
emergency medical services, public health, water, sewer, and
roads), to the work-based anti-poverty and health care programs of
the State of Wisconsin (i.e., Wisconsin Works and BadgerCare,
repectively the state's welfare replacement program and health in-
surance program for low-income working families), to urban school
reform (i.e., reform of Milwaukee's public schools and the creation
of public school choice, charter school options, and private school
choice)-I have developed what might best be called a hunch
about what system of accountability works best when.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL
My hunch is that the administrative model works best and yields
a higher level of accountability when: (1) the task to be performed
is simple, (2) the main object of the task is either a thing or a nar-
row dimension of a person, (3) the public accepts the effectiveness
of a given technique in accomplishing the task, and (4) repetition
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of this technique can be accomplished by a wide variety of individ-
uals. Delivering potable water, sweeping streets, picking up gar-
bage, and vaccinating children-all municipal functions that I have
become familiar with in my work-each meet these four tests.
Each task is relatively simple. Each task focuses on a single thing
(water, the street system, garbage) or a narrow dimension of a per-
son (an unvaccinated child's arm). The public strongly supports
the concepts of piping treated water to homes, sweeping the litter
and dirt off streets, picking up garbage, and inoculating children
against polio, measles, and other crippling diseases. Finally, repeti-
tion gets the job done-good water is piped every minute to every-
one's home, streets are swept on a regular cycle, garbage is picked
up on a predictable schedule, and the process of immunizing one
kid is the same as immunizing 20,000. It is no wonder that, on the
whole, government does a good job through traditional administra-
tive systems of using its own employees to run the water works,
staff the sanitation department, and carry out certain public health
functions like child immunization. One can conclude, as we have
done in Milwaukee, that city government should not immunize
children because Medicaid and employer-sponsored health plans
separately fund immunizations and private doctors are willing to
do it. But as to the question of whether city government has the
capacity to carry out an efficient mass childhood immunization
program, there is little dispute.
THE MARKET MODEL
In contrast, the market model seems to work best and yield a
higher level of accountability, when: (1) the task to be performed is
complex, (2) the main object of the task is a "complete" person, in
all of her or his dimensions, (3) the public does not agree on the
effectiveness of a given technique in accomplishing the task, and
(4) whatever technique may work for some service providers, a dif-
ferent technique is more effective for other providers, and yet a
different approach for others, so that repetition of a single tech-
nique is not an effective strategy. These criteria apply to almost
the entire spectrum of human service activities: job training and
placement, health care and mental health care, alcohol and drug
abuse treatment, and education.
And not surprisingly, we do privatize to a high degree in all these
areas but one. (The one area in which little privatization occurs,
primary and secondary education, is the one around which the na-
tion's most vociferous privatization debate now swirls. More on
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this later.) In Milwaukee, all government-financed training and
placement programs; most health, mental health, alcohol and drug
abuse programs; and a significant part of higher education are not
delivered by government employees but by private firms. Milwau-
kee's experience in these areas is not unique. From what I have
seen of the delivery of these services throughout the U.S., govern-
ment uses its own employees far less to deliver services than it con-
tracts with private vendors to do so.
The great exception to the criteria for privatization spelled out
above, of course, is K-12 education. Few tasks are as difficult to
perform as the education of young children. To educate a child
well, teachers must take the whole child into account-the child's
physical maturation, psychological development, emotional
growth, and moral evolution. There is widespread disagreement
among the public-indeed, among educational professionals-as
to which educational techniques (e.g., phonics versus whole lan-
guage, direct instruction versus Montessori, etc.) are most effec-
tive. The one thing agreed upon is that, as children are so
different, no single technique will succeed with all, nor will every
technique be one that every teacher can master. Yet the U.S. gov-
ernment's approach to K-12 education since the triumph of the
"Common School" in the 1840s has been to deliver the service
through government employees, housed in government buildings,
and generally using the same teaching method. The only large-
scale exception to the exception has emerged in Milwaukee.
Since the mid-1980s, Milwaukee has served as the nation's ex-
periment in the simultaneous and overlapping use, in K-12 educa-
tion, of both mixed systems of accountability. 4 I have had the
privilege to observe and participate in the launching of this experi-
ment. Most of the city's approximately 130,000 K-12 students at-
tend traditional public schools-schools administered directly by
the local Milwaukee Public School ("MPS") Board, but also under
the influence of the significant operational discretion conferred on
principals and teachers. As the result of the 1999 election of a re-
form-minded school board majority, which I actively participated
in helping to elect, even more authority has been delegated to indi-
4. Milwaukee is frequently called "ground zero" in the debate about school
choice. E.g., Alan J. Borsuk, Eyes on Milwaukee for School Choice, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2000, at 1A (listing the numerous reasons why Milwaukee is
"ground zero" for school choice issues).
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vidual schools, their principals, and their teachers.5 -Under the pub-
lic school umbrella, Milwaukee students enjoy a high degree of
what is often called "public school choice." They can attend MPS
neighborhood schools, or MPS specialty schools (with specialties
ranging from Spanish, German, or French immersion to "gifted and
talented" programs, the arts, Montessori, Waldorf, technical, and
many more). They also can opt to attend suburban public schools,
and more than 2000 have done so. But unlike any other American
city, Milwaukee also has partially privatized its education system,
allowing more than 10,000 students at public expense to attend pri-
vate schools that are accountable for meeting different types of
standards.
Milwaukee actually has three distinct K-12 privatization pro-
grams. The first, MPS' own charter school program, allows city
students to attend private schools that have been granted a charter
by MPS. The second is a charter school program that permits three
local non-MPS but public authorities-the Common Council of the
City of Milwaukee ("City"), the University of the Wisconsin-Mil-
waukee ("UWM"), and the Milwaukee Area Technical College
("MATC")-to grant charters to non-sectarian and nonprofit or, in
the case of UWM or MATC, either nonprofit or for-profit schools.6
The City has approved four charter schools, and UWM has ap-
proved two.7 The third and most well-known K-12 privatization
program is the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("MPCP")
that allows up to 15,000 students from families below 175% of the
poverty-line to attend private, nonprofit, and either non-sectarian
or religious schools.8
Fierce political debate and repeated legal challenges have en-
gulfed the MPCP since its inception. Twice, the program's oppo-
nents have filed suits challenging its validity under the Wisconsin
and U.S. Constitutions. 9 Twice, the state's highest court has de-
5. Reformers lost their majority on the Milwaukee Public School Board in 2001,
but at this point it appears that their policy of decentralized "site-based management"
at the school level will remain in place.
6. WIsc. STAT. § 118.40(2r) (2001). This was enacted in 1997 as part of the bien-
nial budget. 1997 Wis. Laws 27 § 2835.
7. I helped to write the City's charter school ordinance and staff the Charter
School Review Committee that oversees the City's four charter schools.
8. WisC. STAT. § 119.23 (2001). This was enacted in 1995 as part of the biennial
budget. 1995 Wis. Laws 27 §§ 4002-4009.
9. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992); Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W. 2d
407, rev'd 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
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clared the program valid.1" Opponents appealed the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's most recent decision to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which denied certiorari.11
When viewed in the context of the many government-financed
programs providing job training and placement, health care and
mental health care, alcohol and drug abuse treatment, and higher
education, all of which use private sector contractors to deliver ser-
vices with minimal controversy about their policy of utilizing pri-
vate vendors, the fierceness of the debate over private school
choice is puzzling. Equally surprising, from this perspective, is the
specific debate over vouchers. We provide health services to the
poor through highly privatized programs (Medicaid, Healthy Start,
and the State Children's Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP"))
that do not require recipients to obtain health care in government-
owned buildings or to be treated by government-hired doctors, but
rather allow the poor to choose among the public and private hos-
pitals, and among the public clinics and private doctors, they be-
lieve will best care for them. Medicaid, Healthy Start, and SCHIP
amount to a health care voucher system. Why, then, do we object
to allowing the poor to educate their children in exactly the same
manner, i.e., by using public funds to choose the public or private
schools they think will do the best job? If the voucher system is
acceptable-indeed, preferable-when it comes to providing the
poor with health care, why is it anathema for K-12 education?
The information problem is identical: most low-income people
know as much about health care and the pros and cons of the spe-
cific hospitals and doctors they have to choose from as they do
about education and the pros and cons of specific schools and
10. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992); Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W. 2d
407, rev'd 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (upholding
the validity of Wisconsin's school voucher law under the Wisconsin and U.S. Constitu-
tions). I wrote an amicus curiae brief submitted in Jackson in support of the law's
constitutionality on behalf of Howard L. Fuller (former Superintendent of Milwaukee
Public Schools), John 0. Norquist (Mayor of Milwaukee), Steven M. Foti (then Ma-
jority Leader of the Wisconsin Assembly), Alberta Darling (State Senator who
chaired the Senate Committee on Education and Financial Institutions, which held
hearings on the legislation in dispute), Margaret A. Farrow (State Senator who served
as Assistant Majority Leader when the law was passed), Joseph Leean (former State
Senator who co-chaired the Joint Committee on Finance when the law was passed),
John S. Gardner (At-Large member of the Milwaukee School Board), Warren D.
Braun (member of the Milwaukee School Board), Bruce R. Thompson (member of
the Milwaukee School Board), and David Lucey (former member of the Milwaukee
School Board).
11. Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W. 2d 407, rev'd 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
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teachers. The expertise problem is also identical: doctors' expertise
is as great (some would say greater) than teachers' expertise. If,
despite limited information on the part of the poor and the enor-
mous expertise of medical professionals, we nonetheless let the
poor pick their hospitals and doctors, why deprive them of the
right to pick their schools and teachers? Yet many of the very peo-
ple who most strongly support Medicaid, Healthy Start, and
SCHIP-indeed, who criticize these programs any time they do not
provide the poor with enough choices-are among the strongest
critics of school choice.
I believe that there are many explanations for this inconsistency.
One is legal-the First Amendment issue of whether government is
establishing a state religion by letting school vouchers go to relig-
ious schools. The most significant factor, probably, is economic.
Teachers, their unions, and the education bureaucracy-like the in-
terest groups that form any organization that enjoys a monopoly-
are loathe to give up their monopoly. But I think that the resis-
tance to school choice also has a lot to do with the issue of cultural
control.
Most human service programs raise few questions about who
controls the nation's culture-its values-and thus, in large mea-
sure, its future. Job training and placement involve no significant
cultural issues. Health care involves a few, centering on birth con-
trol, abortion, and death, but these issues are narrowly confined to
a small percent of the patient population. Mental health care, as
well as alcohol and drug abuse treatment, also involve a narrow set
of cultural issues. But education raises cultural issues for every
child on every school day.
One-sixth of the American population attends K-12 schools.
What our children are taught and how they are taught has a
profound effect on what kind of nation we become. And there is a
great debate about the values taught, endorsed, or condoned in
public schools. Some praise the dominant "value set" for its toler-
ance of diversity, recognition of the wrongs committed by America
in the past, and open-mindedness in matters of behavior and ethics.
Others criticize the dominant "value set" for what they view as its
attack on country and parents, its failure to establish clear lines of
right and wrong, and its disparagement of traditional moral values
of self-discipline.
The debate over school choice, i.e., whether allowing children to
use public dollars to attend their choice of public or private schools
will produce honestly-run, well-managed schools that as a result of
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competition will do a better job of teaching children reading, writ-
ing, and arithmetic, at best plays second fiddle to this cultural de-
bate. Accountability is important. Reasonable people can debate
whether the traditional administrative model for education yields
greater accountability than the market model, although my hypoth-
esis about which model works best in which areas suggests that the
market model is ideally suited to education. But the defining issue
in the choice debate is not accountability for outcome, but control
over culture. Who will control the values of America's children?
Will public funds be restricted to teaching the dominant "value
set," or will the rules allow parents to use public funds to impress
their own private values on the education of their children? In the
end, I believe the decisive school choice battle will be fought on
this cultural front.
